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Executive Summary 
In response to concerns about the quality of the teacher workforce and the distribution of 
teacher quality among schools, some advocates, policymakers, and analysts have proposed 
alternative pay structures for teachers, including merit pay and incentives for hard-to-hire subject 
areas, hard-to-staff schools, and special knowledge and skills. The successful implementation of 
any of these proposals arguably depends a great deal on teacher attitudes. Past attempts to gauge 
teacher attitudes about compensation reforms have produced largely inconsistent results. 
Depending on the poll, teachers are either for or against compensation reform. A possible 
explanation for the inconsistent pattern of results is that most prior research largely ignores 
individual and workplace characteristics that are likely to inform teacher attitudes about pay 
reform. 
This paper describes research designed to shed additional light on how teachers feel about 
different pay and incentive reforms. By linking results from an original survey of Washington 
State teachers to detailed data on school and district characteristics, we are able to analyze how 
teacher opinions differ by individual characteristics (e.g., subject area, school assignment, 
experience) as well as workplace characteristics (e.g., school performance and professional 
collegiality). 
We find that teachers have quite varying attitudes toward different types of pay reform 
proposals. Pay for performance (merit pay), for instance, is viewed favorably by only 17% 
teachers.  By contrast nearly three quarters of teachers favored additional pay for hard-to-staff 
schools.  Support for pay structures for hard-to-hire subject areas and teachers with a National 
Board of Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certificate fell between these extremes with 
41% and 47% supporting these proposals respectively. 
Contextualizing teachers’ opinions, our findings indicate that policymakers interested in 
implementing compensation reforms should think carefully about where (and how) they place 
their bets. For instance, we find veteran teachers are generally less supportive of compensation 
reforms than novice teachers while support for various pay reforms, especially merit pay and 
subject-area pay, varies among secondary and elementary school teachers.  Issues of trust are 
also important, particularly for merit pay, where teachers who have a higher sense of trust 
regarding their fellow teachers are less supportive and those who express a higher sense of trust 
and respect regarding their principal show more support.  
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Introduction 
Today there is a growing chorus of education advocates, analysts, and policymakers for 
reforming teacher compensation (Center for Teaching Policy 2007; Committee for Economic 
Development 2004; Prince 2002; The Business Roundtable 2000; Hassell 2002; Ballou and 
Podgursky 1997; Kelley and Odden 1995). By contrast, public school teachers—and especially 
teachers unions—are often characterized as opponents of such reforms (Moe 2003; Paige 2007). 
Some opinion polls appear to bolster this view of teachers. For example, the well-regarded public 
opinion research organization Public Agenda surveyed 1,345 public school teachers in the spring 
of 2003 about their views on unions, merit pay, and other hot-button topics. The survey included 
a question about whether school districts should pay teachers for things (unspecified) besides 
experience and graduate credits. Half of the teachers said changing the compensation system 
would “open up a can of worms” (Farkas et al. 2003). In Public Agenda’s focus groups, teachers 
expressed a “visceral resistance” to the idea of linking pay to student test scores (Ibid, 25). 
On closer examination, however, teacher attitudes about compensation reform are not so 
simple. When Public Agenda asked whether teachers “who work in tough neighborhoods with 
low-performing schools” should receive extra pay, 70 percent of the teachers surveyed said yes, 
and 67 percent thought that teachers “who consistently work harder, putting in more time and 
effort than other teachers” also deserved extra pay. Twenty years earlier, in the 1980s, a poll by 
the National School Board Association found that 63 percent of teachers supported merit pay 
(Rist 1983). But a nearly contemporaneous poll, conducted by the Gallup Organization and Phi 
Delta Kappa in 1984, found just the opposite: 64 percent of teachers opposed merit pay (Elam 
1989). Elsewhere, an analysis of late-1980’s data on teacher attitudes from the U.S. Department 
of Education’s Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) found that “teachers of disadvantaged and 
low-achieving students are, if anything, more supportive of merit pay than the average teacher” 
(Ballou and Podgursky 1993, 60). More recently, Phi Delta Kappa’s 2000 teacher poll found that 
a slim majority of teachers favor “tying pay to performance,” but very few (3 percent) are willing 
to use student test scores as a factor in determining salaries (Langdon and Vesper 2000). A 
recent poll by the Teaching Commission (2005) found that two-thirds of the general public, and 
one-third of teachers, favor raising pay if the increases were tied to performance. 
This presents a confusing picture about what teachers think of compensation reform—
depending on the poll, they are either for or against it. Part of the problem, of course, is that it 
makes little sense to talk about reform in the abstract. When it comes to specific proposals—
combat pay for difficult working conditions versus merit pay, for instance—teachers in some 
polls appear to draw distinctions. Public Agenda’s teachers favor the former and oppose the later. 
Similarly, it makes little sense to refer to teachers in the abstract. Teacher opinions may vary by 
both individual and workplace characteristics. The interests of a young teacher working in a low-
performing, high-poverty school may be different than those of a veteran teacher working in a 
high-performing, low-poverty school; a high school biology teacher’s interests may be different 
than those of an elementary school teacher. And yet, except for Ballou and Podgursky’s analysis 
of the SASS (1993), prior studies generally do not account for how individual and workplace 
contexts might influence teacher attitudes.1 If individual and workplace characteristics 
differentially and systematically inform how teachers feel about compensation reform, attempts 
                                                
1 Public Agenda does, however, break out its descriptive results by newcomers (<5 years) and veterans (>20 
years). 
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to gauge teacher opinion in general can tell policymakers only so much. If, however, 
policymakers have a sense of how teacher opinion varies by context, they may be able to move 
away from asking sweeping questions about which reforms are “implementable and will work” 
and toward more useful questions about which reforms are implementable and will work under 
what conditions (Honig 2006). 
At the same time, the importance of teacher attitudes, contextualized or not, depends on the 
assumption that teachers’ career decisions are, in fact, responsive to financial incentives. This 
may seem self-evident, but most people are also familiar with the popular counter-argument that 
“teachers aren’t in it for the money.” If that is the case, teacher opinions about compensation 
may be largely beside the point. Interestingly, although studies suggest that teachers do in fact 
respond to differences in wages (Baugh and Stone 1982; Dolton and van der Klaaw 1999; 
Murnane et al. 1991; Stinebrickner 2001), the effects are fairly small (Hanushek et al. 2005; 
Imazeki 2007). Some studies find no statistically significant wage effects on teacher mobility and 
instead suggest that teacher choices are influenced by working conditions and school culture 
(Ingersoll 2001; Smith and Ingersoll 2004).2 And so, in the background of conflicting opinion 
polls about compensation reform is the broader question of whether or not the entire discussion 
is simply barking up the wrong tree. 
In this paper, we present the results from our analysis of data from a recent survey of 
Washington State teachers merged with administrative data on individual and workplace 
characteristics. We consider how teachers view compensation reform, and whether they prefer 
improvements in compensation or improvements in working conditions. On balance we find that 
teachers prefer pay reforms that reward criteria over which they have more control, such as work 
location or subject area. Teachers are far less supportive of pay reforms that link rewards to 
performance, but they also express interesting differences of opinion. Veteran and female 
teachers are less supportive of pay reform in general, whereas secondary teachers are more 
supportive of certain reforms, including merit pay and subject-area bonuses. Interestingly, 
support for merit pay is higher among teachers who have positive impressions about their 
principals and negative impressions of their fellow teachers, and lower among teachers who hold 
their fellow teachers—but not their principals—in high regard. In sum, these findings suggest 
that pay reforms—especially wage differentials for working conditions or subject-area skills—
may be more likely to be implemented successfully if they include opt-in provisions for veteran 
teachers and, in the case of merit pay and subject matter differentials, if they focus on secondary 
teachers. The findings also suggest that policymakers may want to consider experimenting with 
the most popular reform first: extra pay for difficult working conditions, or so-called combat 
pay.3 
The paper is laid out as follows: the next section presents background on compensation 
reform and why teacher attitudes matter; then, we describe our data and methods; next, we 
                                                
2 Some argue that changes in working conditions, rather than compensation, might be a more effective way to 
affect teacher choices. Reed, Reuben, and Barbour (2006) found, for example, that a professional development 
program—California’s Beginning Teacher Support and Assessment (BTSA) program—was more effective and 
efficient at increasing teacher retention than were increases in starting salaries. Based on a recent survey of 
California teachers, Futernick (2007) similarly argues that teachers are more concerned with working conditions 
than compensation when it comes to decisions to stay in or leave the profession. 
3 Although support for combat pay is high among teachers (favoring policy implementation) one can imagine 
that community politics might hinder policy adoption.  
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present our results; and finally, we conclude with policy implications and thoughts about further 
research.  
Background 
Under the status quo, the overwhelming majority of local school districts (upwards of 90 
percent) pay teachers according to published pay tables, known as single salary schedules 
(Strizek et al. 2006). These district-level schedules typically reward two characteristics: 
experience and degree level.4  In addition, 21 states, including Washington, also have statewide 
salary schedules (Burke 2005). For the most part, these state-level schedules set a minimum 
teacher salary. Washington, however, also uses its state schedule to set the maximum average 
salary for each district and, importantly, to calculate state salary allocations to districts (Bergeson 
et al. 2004; Plecki 2001). Although teacher salaries in Washington are technically negotiated at 
the local level, the state’s allocation method creates a de facto constraint on local salary 
variation. School districts, which get 70 percent of their funding from the state, receive only the 
amount of funding that their actual mix of teachers would garner on the state schedule.5  
According to state law, districts can exceed the state’s limitations on salaries “only by separate 
contract for additional time, additional responsibilities, or incentives.”6 These supplemental 
contracts must use local dollars and cannot exceed one year in duration. 
As with civil service compensation in general, a single salary schedule like Washington’s has 
some straightforward advantages: everyone is rewarded equally based on objective criteria, and 
the system is predictable and easy to understand. These advantages notwithstanding, critics argue 
that such salary structures have several shortcomings: they reward characteristics that are only 
weakly connected to teacher quality (Hanushek 1986; Hanushek and Rivkin 1997), they fail to 
recognize that some teaching jobs are harder than others (Prince 2002), and they create high 
opportunity costs for people with special skills or abilities (Goldhaber et al. 2007; Goldhaber and 
Liu 2003).7  
In response to these shortcomings, advocates, policymakers, and analysts have proposed 
several alternatives to the salary schedule, ranging from individual and school-based merit pay 
(perhaps the most well-known reform proposal), to compensating wage differentials for hard-to-
hire subject areas, hard-to-staff schools, or special knowledge and skills. Governor Chris 
Gregoire’s recent review of Washington’s education system, called Washington Learns, puts 
                                                
4 First adopted to minimize racial or gender discrimination, the single salary schedule has now been in use in 
public education for almost a century (Odden and Kelly 2002). 
5 As of the 2006-07 school year, Washington’s state schedule pays a teacher with a bachelor’s degree and no 
experience $31,386; a teacher with a master’s degree and no experience receives $37,386. The highest step on the 
schedule is $59,157 (16 years of service or more, plus a PhD or an MA+90 credits). Current WA state salary 
schedules (2005/06 and 2006/07) are available at http://www.k12.wa.us/safs/ under Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ). Of Washington’s 296 school districts, 34 have “grandfathered” allocations that allow them to pay teachers 
slightly higher salaries than those delineated by the state salary schedule (our analysis suggests, however, that 
teaching in these districts does not have a strong relationship with one’s attitudes about compensation reform).  
6 RCW 28A.400.200 (4) 
7 Some analyses suggest that the opportunity costs of teaching can approach $10,000 per year for a man with a 
technical major who graduated from a more-selective college (Goldhaber and Liu 2003). For both men and women, 
the opportunity costs of teaching grow over time; and while women may start their careers in teaching better off 
financially, they lose ground over time to women in the non-teacher labor market (Goldhaber et al. 2007).  
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many of these reforms on the policy agenda. The initiative’s final report, for example, argues that 
the state should “compensate teachers for their performance” and “acknowledge assignments that 
are difficult [with extra compensation]” (Washington Learns 2006, 40). 
Compensation reform proposals may be promising in the abstract—for instance, the higher 
marginal incentives associated with merit pay theoretically should attract higher-ability and less 
risk-averse people to teaching—but their actual effects are far from clear. A long line of studies 
highlights the difficulty of implementing merit pay in schools (Ballou 2001; Goldhaber 2002; 
Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1984; Murnane and Cohen 1986).8 By contrast, there is little 
empirical evidence on the labor market effects of rewarding teachers for meeting certain 
standards or competencies, such as National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
certification, or for providing extra pay for hard-to-staff schools or hard-to-hire subject areas, 
although new evidence suggests that higher salaries might be effective for retaining teachers in 
high-poverty schools (Clotfelter et al. 2006). 
Regardless of their merits, whether or not districts and states can successfully adopt and 
implement any of these reforms ultimately depends on political dynamics and teacher attitudes. 
Teachers unions clearly play an important role when it comes to adopting reforms (Goldhaber et 
al. 2007; Koppich 2006; Moe 2006), either by forcing accommodations, blocking reforms, or 
actively encouraging and sustaining them. Union leaders also play an important role after 
adoption (they still hold the formal power to make binding decisions on behalf of teachers), but 
the actions and interests of individual teachers also become more relevant. As Boyd et al. (2003) 
note, teachers are the only school-based resources that actually have preferences about whether 
to teach, what to teach, and where to teach. As the targets of compensation policies, teachers and 
their preferences clearly inform policy. Local misgivings among teachers in Florida, for 
example, impeded the implementation of that state’s merit pay plan, called Special Teachers Are 
Rewarded (STAR) (Fineout 2007). Even with $147.5 million dollars at stake, some Florida 
districts refused to carry out the STAR reforms and others reluctantly designed plans that they 
hoped would never be used (Ibid; Weber 2006). Eventually the state decided to rethink the entire 
initiative and replace it with a revised plan called the Merit Award Program (MAP). 
On the whole, if we accept that teachers’ views on compensation reform are important, and 
that their attitudes are influenced by individual and workplace characteristics, policymakers 
might be able to avoid problems like those encountered in Florida if they can make distinctions 
about the attitudes of sub-groups of teachers and schools. Knowing which types of teachers 
working under which conditions are more open to experimentation might increase the odds that 
reforms receive a fair trial. Contextualized information about teacher attitudes is not the only 
data that policymakers interested in experimentation need, but without it the prospects for 
compensation reform are arguably more uncertain. 
 
 
 
                                                
8 A smaller collection of studies suggests merit pay reforms have more potential (Clotfelter and Ladd 1996; Dee 
and Keys 2004; Lavy 2002). 
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What Affects Teacher Attitudes? 
We take the straightforward view that individuals’ attitudes about compensation reform are a 
function of their personal attributes as well as their work context. We expect, for example, that 
individuals will support various compensation proposals to the degree that the proposals aid or 
reward people like themselves (Katz 1960). As for work context, we expect that teachers 
working in low-performing schools will be more supportive of some compensation reforms. In 
particular, we expect they will support combat pay, as they are the likely targets for increased 
compensation due to job difficulty. In addition, because concerns about fairness are often cited as 
a reason that teachers oppose pay reforms (Hatry et al. 1984; Middleton 1989; Murnane and 
Cohen 1986; Porwoll 1979), and because research suggests that schools with high levels of 
social trust may be more likely to adopt innovations (Bryk and Schneider 2002), we also expect 
that individuals who work in schools with more trusting professional relationships will be more 
likely to support compensation reform. 
Data and Methods 
Data 
Our analysis of teacher attitudes is based on the Washington State Teacher Compensation 
Survey (WSTCS), an original survey sent to 5,238 teachers in the state of Washington during the 
spring of 2006. Teachers were selected for participation using a stratified random sampling 
procedure based on the urbanicity of school districts in Washington State (i.e., serving urban, 
suburban, or rural communities), poverty level of schools, and teacher’s years of teaching 
experience.  In order to explore how teacher attitudes vary by context, we merged the survey 
results with administrative data on teacher characteristics such as certification status and 
education from Washington State personnel files and with Washington State data on school 
characteristics such as student demographics and school performance.  
A total of 3,120 full-time classroom teachers were included in the analyses, resulting in a 
response rate between 60 and 75 percent, depending on the method of calculation.  In order to 
test the representativeness of the achieved sample to the sampling frame, t-tests for means were 
estimated for various teacher and school-level characteristics; few significant differences were 
found.9  Appendix A provides a table describing our sample of full-time classroom teachers. A 
detailed discussion of the administrative data sets, the survey design, and our response rates is 
provided in Appendix B. We describe our variable coding in Appendix C. 
The WSTCS asked teachers how they felt about giving extra pay to each of the following 
types of teachers: (1) teachers who specialize in hard-to-fill subjects, such as science and 
mathematics (subject-area pay); (2) teachers who work in tough neighborhoods with poorly 
                                                
9 Our obtained sample has slightly fewer female teachers (67% versus 69% for the population) and moderately 
higher percentage of teachers with a master’s degree or higher (62% versus 58%).  No differences exist with regards 
to teachers’ age, years of teaching experience, and racial/ethnic composition (white, black, and Hispanic).  Among 
schools, our sample has a higher average enrollment (583 versus 520 students) and percentage students receiving 
free and reduced-priced lunch (42% versus 40%) and fewer special education students (12.5% versus 13.1%).  No 
significant differences are found for the proportion school types (high, middle, and elementary school), student-
teacher ratio, and mathematics and reading proficiency.  
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performing schools (combat pay); (3) teachers whose students make greater gains on 
standardized tests than similar students taught by other teachers (merit pay); and (4) teachers 
who receive certification from the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), 
a voluntary program of national certification (NBPTS incentive). Responses were measured on a 
4-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 4 (strongly favor). These WSTCS 
questions mirror items in the 2003 Public Agenda survey and some of the 1987-88 SASS items 
analyzed by Ballou and Podgursky (1993), to allow for meaningful comparisons. 
The WSTCS also included several items that went beyond prior surveys of teacher opinions. 
It asked how much of a differential (in dollars) respondents thought was fair for each type of 
teacher, and it forced them to rank their support for providing extra pay to each type of teacher. 
In addition, the survey included questions about preferences for guaranteed income versus cost-
equivalent changes in working conditions (for example, $5,000 versus an additional 3.5 hours of 
prep time each week). 
Table 1 shows WSTCS respondents’ support for various types of incentive pay. Of the four 
different types of incentive pay, respondents were most in favor of giving extra pay to teachers 
who work in tough neighborhoods with low-performing schools (72 percent favor, 28 percent 
strongly favor). This strong support mirrors the results of both the 2003 Public Agenda survey 
(70 percent net favor) and Ballou and Podgursky’s 1987-88 SASS analysis (77.2 percent net 
favor), although the SASS items they used referred to, “a high-priority situation (e.g., in an 
inner-city school)” rather than work in “a tough neighborhood with low-performing schools.”  
Surprisingly, very few of the teachers that we surveyed (only 0.1 percent) reported being in a 
district that offered combat pay, suggesting (at least anecdotally) that teacher opposition is not 
the primary explanation for the lack of combat pay in Washington State.10  
Compared with their attitudes toward combat pay, WSTCS respondents were far less inclined 
to favor subject-area pay, merit pay, and NBPTS incentives, and, in general, they showed lower 
levels of support for all of these reforms than the Public Agenda survey and 1987-88 SASS 
respondents did. For example, 41 percent of the WSTCS teachers favored subject-area pay, 
versus 42 percent of Public Agenda teachers and 54 percent of the SASS teachers. Only 17 
percent of the WSTCS teachers favored merit pay, versus 38 percent of Public Agenda teachers 
and 55 percent of the SASS teachers. Regarding merit pay, it is worth noting that the while the 
WSTCS and Public Agenda survey items framed teacher performance in terms of student test 
scores, the 1987-88 SASS question asked teachers if they favor “A merit pay bonus for 
exceptional performance in a given year?” without specifying what “performance” means or 
how it might be measured. NBPTS did not yet exist in the late 1980s, and so we can only 
compare WSTCS support (46.8 percent net favor) to Public Agenda support (57 percent net 
favor). 
WSTCS respondents’ attitudes about what would be a “fair” incentive under each scenario 
reflect these general patterns of support and opposition, with higher values for combat pay (a 
mean of $4,280), lower values for merit pay (a mean of $1,195) and middling values for subject-
area pay ($2,316) and NBPTS incentives ($2,136). If we exclude those who thought no amount 
                                                
10 In fact, teachers reported that none of the incentives mentioned in the survey are widely used: only 0.4 
percent said their districts offered incentives for hard-to-fill subjects; 0.1 percent said their districts offered merit 
pay; and 35 percent said their districts offered NBPTS bonuses (Washington offered a state NBPTS bonus of $3,500 
during the 2005-2006 school year). 
Working Paper 20  Goldhaber, DeArmond, and DeBurgomaster 
10 
of extra pay was fair (they answered $0), all of the values increase: merit pay rises to $3,123, 
subject-area pay rises to $3,922, combat pay rises to $5, 322, and NBPTS incentives rises to 
$3,201. By way of comparison, Denver Public School’s ProComp compensation system offers 
teachers in hard-to-staff subject areas and schools a 3 percent bonus ($1,026 for a teacher earning 
$34,200) as well as an array of performance bonuses that, based on a $34,000 salary, would total 
around $2,000 (Denver Public Schools 2007). 
 
Table 1. Teachers’ Attitudes Toward Different Pay Structuresa 
 Attitude Toward Incentives in General  Attitude Toward Incentive Amounts  
 
Strongly 
Favor 
(%) 
Somewhat 
Favor 
(%) 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
(%) 
Strongly 
Oppose 
(%) 
Receive 
Incentive 
(%) 
“Fair” Amount 
With “$0” 
(Mean/Med) 
“Fair” Amount 
Without “$0” 
(Mean/Med)b 
N 
Subject-Area Pay 10.37 30.67 27.09 31.87    3,082 
     0.28   3,120 
      $2,316 / 1,000  2,849 
       $3,922 / 3,000 1,780 
         
Combat Pay 28.06 44.36 15.61 11.97    3,086 
     0.03   3,120 
      4,280 / 5,000  2,858 
       5,322 / 5,000 2,379 
         
Merit Pay 3.23 14.00 22.64 60.13    3,079 
     0.04   3,120 
      1,195 / 0  2,831 
       3,123 / 2,000 1,116 
         
NBPTS Incentive 12.19 34.59 23.34 29.89    3,075 
     1.11   3,120 
      2,136 / 1,500  2,838 
       3,201 / 3,000 1,966 
a Descriptive statistics are calculated using sampling weights. 
b Excludes respondents who thought no amount of extra pay was fair. 
 
Table 2 further explores the WSTCS results by showing how respondents ranked the four 
types of incentive pay. The findings for combat and merit pay are unambiguous: combat pay 
received the most-preferred ranks (1) and the least-unfavorable ranks (4). The opposite is true for 
merit pay. Only about 5 percent of respondents gave merit pay the top rank; 56 percent gave it 
the lowest. The direction of the other two types of incentive pay is less consistent. Respondents’ 
preference for NBPTS incentives is fairly equally distributed among all four ranks, but slightly 
skewed toward the low ranking. Subject-area pay appears to be a middling preference: the 
responses are mostly in the middle (2s and 3s), with relatively few responses in the top and 
bottom ranks. 
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Table 2. Teachers’ Rankings of Pay Structuresa 
 Rankings (%)  
 1 2 3 4  
 
Most-
Preferred 
  
Least-
Preferred 
N 
Subject-Area Pay 12.21 39.69 34.40 13.71 3,003 
Combat Pay 63.17 24.39 9.93 2.50 3,022 
Merit Pay 5.45 12.95 25.48 56.12 2,985 
NBPTS Incentive 20.30 22.26 28.40 29.05 3,001 
a Descriptive statistics are calculated using sampling weights. 
 
Table 3 depicts the trade-offs between salary increases and working conditions, and shows 
that the WSTCS respondents generally preferred increases in salary.11 Eighty-three percent of 
respondents said they preferred a salary increase of $5,000 to having two fewer students in all of 
the classes they teach, 88 percent preferred the increase to having a full-time teacher’s aide who 
they share with four other teachers, and 69 percent preferred the increase to an additional 3.5 
hours of prep time each week. 
 
Table 3. Teachers’ Preferences for Annual Pay Increases Versus Workplace 
Changea 
 
Prefer a $5,000 
Increase (%) 
N 
Two fewer students in all of the classes you teach 82.70 3,067 
A new full-time teacher’s aide who splits time between 
your class and four other teachers at your school 
88.01 3,058 
3.5 more hours of prep time each week 69.35 3,057 
a Descriptive statistics are calculated using sampling weights. 
 
While these findings are suggestive, they treat all teachers and teaching jobs as the same. For 
a more contextualized picture of teachers’ opinions, we need to account for both individual and 
workplace characteristics. 
 
 
                                                
11 For the class-size trade-off, we assume that $5,000 is 10 percent of the average teacher salary ($50,000), 
translating into a 10 percent reduction in class size. The average class size in Washington State is 19.2, so our cost 
equivalent reduction included two students. For a teacher’s aide, we assume that an aide makes $25,000, so $5,000 
would buy 20 percent of his or her time—that is, splitting an aide between with four other teachers. Finally, we 
assume that a teacher works a 180-day year for 7 hours a day and earn $50,000, therefore an extra $5,000 would buy 
3.5 hours of that teacher’s time per week.  
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Methods 
First, we consider how context affects teacher support for the four types of incentives 
described above: merit pay, subject-area pay, combat pay, and NBPTS incentives. For each 
incentive type we estimate an ordered probit model, 
(1) 
! 
y
*
= "
0
+ "
1
Xi + "2Sij + "3Tij + uij  
where support for each incentive is reflected in high values of 
! 
y
*and opposition is reflected in 
low values of 
! 
y
*; 
! 
X
i
 is a vector of individual teacher characteristics; 
! 
Sij  is a vector of school 
characteristics for school 
! 
j ; and 
! 
Tij  is a vector of the teacher’s impression of the level of trust 
and collegiality in his or her workplace. Following the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, 
! 
y
*  crosses three unknown “thresholds” as survey responses move from “strongly oppose” to 
“somewhat oppose” to “somewhat favor” to “strongly favor”. Estimation is by maximum 
likelihood with 
! 
"  being estimated along with the unknown boundary values that define the 
ranges of support captured in the index 
! 
y
* . 
Second, we use Tobit and OLS models12 to explore respondents’ support for the various 
types of incentives as measured by the amount of money they think would be “fair” to give as 
extra pay to each of the four types of teachers, 
(2) 
! 
Ii = "0 + "1Xi + "2Sij + "3Tij + uij  
where 
! 
I
i
 is the incentive amount a respondent thinks is fair. As before, we run models separately 
for each type of incentive/teacher and include vectors of teacher characteristics, 
! 
X
i
, school 
characteristics, 
! 
Sij , and teacher impression about workplace trust and collegiality, 
! 
Tij . 
Finally we explore respondents’ opinions about the trade-offs between improvements in pay 
and cost-equivalent improvements in working conditions using a logit model,  
(3) 
! 
SIi = "0 + "1Xi + "2Sij + "3Tij + uij  
where 
! 
SI
i
 is a binary measure of whether teacher 
! 
i  prefers a sure income increase of $5,000 
(
! 
SI =1) or a cost-equivalent improvement in working conditions (
! 
SI = 0). 
For each of the three model equations, the error term capturing teacher and school effects not 
included among our independent variables, 
! 
uij , is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d. N(0,1)).  Since teachers and schools are also situated within school districts, we 
applied robust variance estimates to adjust for this clustering within districts.  Additional model 
specifications were estimated with fixed-effects for teachers’ school district to control for 
potential district-specific effects on teachers’ preferences separately and also in conjunction with 
robust variance estimates adjusting for the clustering of teachers within schools.13  In general, 
these alternative specifications yield findings that are substantively similar to those obtained 
                                                
12 We utilize a Tobit model when we classify individuals who said they do not support any incentive as 
supporting a value of $0 in order to account for zero-inflation. We use an OLS model when we restrict our sample to 
those individuals who support some positive incentive. 
13 For the Ordered Probit and Tobit models, a dummy variable for all but one of the districts was included in the 
model equation.  
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when using district-robust variances.  For ease of presentation and reasons of parsimony, we 
report only the results of the analyses using within-district variance adjustments. 
For our independent variables, we rely on data from both the WSTCS as well as Washington 
State’s S-275 administrative dataset on individual teacher characteristics, including gender, 
race/ethnicity (measured separately by black and Hispanic), years of teaching experience, 
whether the teacher has a master’s degree or higher, whether the teacher has a bachelor’s degree 
in mathematics (mathematics or statistics) or the natural sciences (biology/life sciences, 
chemistry, geology/earth science, or physics), the selectivity of the college the teacher attended 
(selective, competitive, less competitive),14 whether the teacher’s assignment is in mathematics 
or the natural sciences, and whether the teacher receives the incentive in question. We rely on 
data from Washington State’s School Report Card as well as the Common Core of Data 
published by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for information on school 
characteristics, including the percent of FRL-eligible students, percent of students in special 
education programs, an indicator for school type (elementary, middle, and high school), the 
school’s urbanicity (urban, suburban, and rural), school enrollment, student-teacher ratio, and the 
percent of students passing the Washington Assessment of Student Learning (measured 
separately for math and for reading). Finally, we rely on the WSTCS for teachers’ impressions 
regarding the amount of trust and collegiality at their school, measured separately with regards to 
(1) their fellow teachers and (2) their principal. We explain these two trust measures in more 
detail in Appendix C.15 
Results 
Support for Pay Reforms 
Table 4 shows results for the ordered probit models for all four types of incentive plans.16 
Several findings are consistent with Ballou and Podgursky’s (1993) analysis of attitudes toward 
merit pay (column 1): both women and teachers with more experience appear to be less 
supportive of merit pay, Hispanic teachers are more supportive than whites (the omitted group), 
and the coefficient for Black teachers is positive, but not statistically significant.17 We also find, 
unsurprisingly, that teachers who identify themselves as members of teachers unions are less 
supportive of merit pay. Our results indicate mixed support for Ballou and Podgursky’s (1993) 
finding that attitudes about merit pay were independent of student poverty.  That is, we find 
                                                
14 Our college selectivity measures come from Barron’s Profiles of American College’s rankings for the year 
1986, when the mean teacher surveyed would have entered college. We collapse Barron’s six rankings - most 
competitive; highly competitive; very competitive; competitive; less competitive; and non-competitive - into three 
categories for our analyses: selective, competitive, and less competitive. Our “selective” category collapses Barron’s 
top three rankings because of the small number of teachers graduating from these schools. Barron’s rankings also 
list some schools as highly competitive (+) and very competitive (+) if they are on the border of the next category. 
We included them in the listed category, not the next-highest category. 
15 Note, however, that these attitudinal measures may be endogenous, as teacher attitudes may be shaped in part 
by the type of compensation structure used in their schools. 
16 We ran models with and without the teacher’s impressions of his or her fellow teachers and principal 
(Teacher Trust Index and Principal Trust Index); these measures had little impact on the other estimated coefficients, 
so we only report the full models here. 
17 When the total district effects and clustering of teachers within schools are taken into account, the coefficient 
for Hispanic teacher is no longer statistically significant.  
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teachers in schools with higher proportions of students eligible for free/reduced-price lunch 
(FRL) are more supportive of merit pay in the parsimonious model, although this effect 
disappears when district effects and within-school clustering are controlled. We also find that 
high school teachers, relative to elementary school teachers, are more supportive of merit pay. 
The two trust measures indicate that teachers who have a higher sense of trust and respect 
regarding their fellow teachers are less supportive of merit pay, while those who have a higher 
sense of trust and respect regarding their principal are more supportive of merit pay. This result 
may reflect that when teachers feel connected to their colleagues, they are wary of a pay system 
that raises the specter of teachers “competing with one another,” especially if a school culture 
values egalitarianism. Conversely, to the degree that teachers have confidence in their principal, 
they appear more willing to support merit pay. Although the question did not define performance 
in terms of the principal’s evaluation of the teachers (it defined it in terms of students’ test-score 
growth), teachers may nevertheless see merit pay as a proposal that somehow involves 
principals’ judgments. 
Column 2 suggests that teacher opinions about extra pay for hard-to-fill subject areas, such as 
mathematics and science, are both similar to and different from their opinions about merit pay. 
As with the merit pay findings, veteran teachers and women are less supportive of subject-area 
incentives, and Hispanic teachers are more supportive. Unlike merit pay, however, teachers with 
middle and high school assignments in mathematics and science are more supportive of subject-
area bonuses—which is consistent with their self-interest. When it comes to the trust factors, 
however, it appears that a teachers’ support for subject-area incentives is not systematically 
related to impressions of his or her coworkers. 
When looking at the most-popular incentive plan—combat pay—in column 3, we find that 
only the positive coefficients for experience and student poverty, as well as the negative 
coefficient for mathematics performance, are statistically significant, suggesting that, with these 
exceptions, support for combat pay is not systematically related to the individual or workplace 
characteristics included in the model.  
Finally, column 4 looks at incentive pay for teachers who are certified by the National Board 
for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). It is no great surprise that teachers who receive 
this incentive support the idea of giving extra pay to NBPTS-certified teachers (Washington 
State provides a stipend for NBPTS certification). As we find with the other incentives, 
experienced teachers are less supportive of NBPTS incentives, but women, by contrast, are more 
supportive.  When we add the trust measures, respondents’ impressions of their fellow teachers 
are not statistically significant, but those who feel more trust and respect toward their principal 
are more supportive of NBPTS incentives.  We also find that teachers who identify themselves as 
members of teachers unions are more supportive of incentive pay for NBPTS certification after 
controlling for school district effects and the clustering of teachers within schools (results not 
shown). 
We should note that contrary to our expectation that teachers in low-performing schools 
would be more supportive of incentives, the coefficients for mathematics and reading 
performance are not statistically significant across all four incentives, with two exceptions.  On 
the one hand, teachers in schools with higher math scores appear to be less supportive of combat 
pay, an incentive for which they are unlikely to qualify.  On the other hand, teachers in schools 
with higher reading score were more supportive of combat pay, although this effect only reaches 
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statistical significance after holding constant district effects and accounting for within-school 
clustering. 
Table 4. Factors Influencing Teachers’ Attitudes About Compensation Reform 
Variable 
 
Merit Pay 
(1) 
Subject-Area 
Pay 
(2) 
 
Combat Pay 
(3) 
NBPTS 
Incentive 
(4) 
School Factors     
Community Type a     
Suburban -.026 -.024 -.010 -.016 
 (.063) (.062) (.069) (.054) 
Rural -.111 -.084 -.091 -.128 
 (.081) (.073) (.072) (.065) 
School Type b     
High School .240** -.002 .040 .106 
 (.090) (.089) (.095) (.089) 
Middle School .028 -.290*** -.043 -.014 
 (.074) (.077) (.078) (.058) 
School Enrollment 1.500e-5 -8.850e-5 6.540e-5 -3.680e-5 
 (5.610e-5) (5.120e-5) (6.100e-5) (6.510e-5) 
Ratio of Students to Teachers -.005 -.003 -.002 -.006 
 (.007) (.007) (.010) (.008) 
Eligible for Free/Reduced-Price Lunch (%)  .004** -.000 .005** -.000 
 (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
Special Education Students (%) -.002 .002 .001 -.002 
 (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Math Proficiency (%) -.337 -.188 -.699* -.119 
 (.313) (.315) (.300) (.287) 
Reading Proficiency (%) .328 -.346 .245 -.091 
 (.451) (.373) (.392) (.373) 
Teacher Factors     
Experience (years) -.009** -.020*** -.019*** -.023*** 
 (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Master’s Degree or Better -.022 .002 -.027 .039 
 (.044) (.044) (.034) (.043) 
Female -.121* -.213*** .073 .150** 
 (.047) (.045) (.050) (.053) 
Black .052 .235 .341 -.068 
 (.152) (.143) (.194) (.242) 
Hispanic .290* .436** .226 .027 
 (.131) (.133) (.161) (.145) 
College Selectivity c     
Selective -.061 -.034 .035 .025 
 (.083) (.077) (.075) (.085) 
Competitive .022 -.052 -.080 -.056 
 (.078) (.071) (.072) (.083) 
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Table 4 (cont’d). Factors Influencing Teachers’ Attitudes About Compensation 
Reform 
Variable 
 
Merit Pay 
(1) 
Subject-Area 
Pay 
(2) 
 
Combat Pay 
(3) 
NBPTS 
Incentive 
(4) 
Teacher Factors (cont’d)     
Bachelor’s in Math or Science -.142 .042 -.101 .077 
 (.084) (.088) (.093) (.086) 
Teaching Assignment in Math or Science -.110 .211 .296 -.070 
 (.233) (.298) (.300) (.238) 
School Type x Assignment Interaction     
High School–Math Science Assign. .492 1.179*** .237 .236 
 (.254) (.330) (.307) (.253) 
Middle School–Math Science Assign. .442 .850** .075 .276 
 (.246) (.320) (.310) (.256) 
Receives Pay Incentive -.281 .531 .602 1.889*** 
 (.702) (.678) (.748) (.262) 
Household Income (per $1,000) .001 .000 -.001 -.001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Married -.004 -.067 -.022 -.023 
 (.058) (.050) (.054) (.053) 
Member of Teachers Union -.347** -.026 .092 .118 
 (.120) (.104) (.106) (.113) 
Teacher Trust Index -.182*** .007 -.005 .016 
 (.043) (.039) (.036) (.037) 
Principal Trust Index .145*** .035 .050 .134*** 
 (.029) (.030) (.026) (.028) 
Threshold 1 -.137 -1.319 -1.309 -.586 
 (.388) (.318) (.373) (.315) 
Threshold 2 .602 -.537 -.718 .066 
 (.387) (.318) (.372) (.316) 
Threshold 3 1.554 .705 .554 1.227 
 (.392) (.316) (.380) (.321) 
-Log-likelihood 3,158.6 3,771.8 3,671.0 3,950.9 
Sample Size 3,078 3,081 3,085 3,074 
a Referent group is urban community; b Referent group is elementary school; c Referent group is less competitive 
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
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Table 5 provides a more intuitive interpretation of some of the results in table 4, by 
presenting predicted probabilities for several hypothetical ideal teacher-types and their support 
for pay incentives, using merit pay for our example. Table 5 shows the predicted probability of 
supporting merit pay for a veteran teacher (25 years of experience) and a novice teacher (2 years 
of experience) at the high school level who is a white woman and who otherwise has the mean 
characteristics of the sample. As the first two rows of the table show, both ideal types are 
overwhelmingly opposed to merit pay, but the novice teacher is slightly more likely to be 
supportive (.22 versus .17). If, however, we redefine our hypothetical teachers to have extreme 
values on the trust index, the picture changes significantly. As the third and forth rows show, the 
probability of a novice teacher supporting merit pay when he or she has a high level of trust 
toward his or her principal and a low level of trust toward his or her fellow teachers rises to .43, 
almost double the base example.  Nevertheless, even this most supportive case is not very likely 
to accept merit pay.  Conversely, if the same teacher’s principal-trust index is low and his or her 
teacher-trust index is high, the probability of supporting merit pay drops to .12, less than the base 
example’s veteran teacher. Although not shown here, the predicted probabilities for the other 
incentives suggest that novice high school teachers are about twice as likely as veteran high 
school teachers to “strongly favor” subject-area pay, combat pay, and NBPTS incentives. 
 
 
Table 5. Predicted Probabilities for Female Teachers’ Support for Merit Pay 
 Predicted Probability 
 
Strongly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Teachers whose students make greater gains on 
standardized tests than similar students taught by 
other teachers 
    
Basic Ideal Types     
Veteran High School Teacher 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.59 
Novice High School Teacher 0.04 0.18 0.27 0.51 
Ideal Types with varying regard for coworkers     
Veteran High School Teacher 
Low teacher trust/High principal trust 
0.09 0.25 0.29 0.37 
Veteran High School Teacher 
High teacher trust/Low principal trust 
0.01 0.07 0.18 0.74 
Novice High School Teacher 
Low teacher trust/High principal trust 
0.13 0.30 0.28 0.29 
Novice High School Teacher 
High teacher trust/Low principal trust 
0.02 0.10 0.21 0.67 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 20  Goldhaber, DeArmond, and DeBurgomaster 
18 
How Much Money is Fair? 
Table 6 shows the results of our Tobit and OLS models for each of the four incentive plans. 
Here, the dependent variable is the amount of money (in dollars) that teachers think is fair to give 
each type of teacher. The overall patterns are broadly consistent with those found in table 4.18 
Beginning with the Tobit results, which include respondents who think no amount of extra pay is 
fair, the coefficient for experience is negative and statistically significant across all four incentive 
types. Likewise, the coefficient for female is negative and significant for merit pay and subject-
area pay. The teacher-trust and principal-trust indices also mirror the earlier findings: for a one-
point gain, the “fair” value of the merit pay reward increases by $375 on the principal-trust index 
and decreases by $903 on the teacher-trust index. As before, high school mathematics and 
science teachers favor subject-area incentives (by $3,053) and teachers who receive an NBPTS 
incentive think a fair bonus would be $4,786. As with the ordered probit, the coefficient for 
suburban and rural teachers is negative (relative to urban teachers) for merit pay, but here it is 
statistically significant for rural teachers. 
When we restrict the sample to only those who gave a positive “fair” value and run OLS 
models, the signs of the coefficients remain unchanged, but some are no longer statistically 
significant (for example, the negative coefficient for experience is statistically significant only 
for NBPTS incentives). Unlike the ordered probit results, in this case teachers who receive 
combat pay is statistically significant, but the coefficients are relatively small (teachers who 
receive a combat pay incentive think a fair bonus would be $1,206). Also, unlike the prior 
results, respondents who work in schools with higher math proficiency scores support larger 
bonuses: for every 1 percentage point gain in math proficiency, teachers think a fair combat pay 
incentive would be $3,302. 
These differences aside, the results in table 6 generally reinforce our previous findings about 
the types of teachers who support compensation reforms and suggest that there are some 
important differences among teachers hidden beneath the means presented in table 1. Whereas 
the mean “fair” amount for a subject-area bonus in table 1 was $2,317, table 6 shows that high 
school mathematics and science teachers, all else equal, put the amount at $3,053; but for every 
additional year of experience, that amount drops by $64. 
                                                
18 Introducing controls for district fixed effects and accounting for within-school clustering of teachers suggests 
some instability in our model estimates, particularly for the Tobit models. For example, being a high school 
mathematics or science teacher is independent of a ‘fair’ amount for merit pay in the Tobit model and then negative 
and statistically significant in the OLS model.  When we account for the district effects and clustering within 
schools, however, mathematics and science teachers appear to favor merit pay (by $4,395) in the Tobit model, yet 
are independent in the OLS model (results available upon request). This example represents the most extreme case, 
but indicates caution should be used in interpreting these estimates. 
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Table 6. Placing a Monetary Value as Opposed to Subjective Attitude 
 Merit Pay  Subject-Area Pay  Combat Pay  NBPTS Incentive 
Variable Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS 
School Factors            
Community Type a            
     Suburban -432.92 -794.67**  -694.61 -419.75  -130.61 -116.10  -61.39 -164.74 
 (336.40) (285.45)  (366.33) (256.20)  (373.06) (336.94)  (183.93) (192.80) 
     Rural -1166.67** -1171.04**  -745.44 -465.92  -220.17 -310.95  -507.24* -218.83 
 (435.30) (423.72)  (388.18) (372.57)  (441.99) (429.64)  (252.37) (260.97) 
School Type b            
     High School 688.77 -370.73  716.53 883.04  1004.11 1037.95*  423.86 431.00 
 (489.28) (403.11)  (339.18) (517.47)  (516.22) (478.75)  (311.42) (286.06) 
     Middle School 272.88 -55.85  -716.97* -21.64  86.92 30.37  31.90 -18.73 
 (438.74) (306.93)  (339.18) (372.57)  (359.34) (335.09)  (225.42) (190.59) 
School Enrollment 0.01 0.05  -0.70* -0.07  -0.31 -0.09  -0.12 -0.09 
 (0.30) (0.26)  (0.27) (0.27)  (0.28) (0.27)  (0.20) (0.17) 
Ratio of Students to Teachers -5.55 -47.68  17.93 -18.84  24.77 -3.87  -23.60 -35.95 
 (38.49) (30.11)  (33.50) (30.17)  (43.34) (33.48)  (26.76) (26.09) 
Eligible for Free/Reduced Lunch (FRL) (%) 16.09 6.40  1.04 6.01  14.83 10.17  -2.28 -5.02 
 (8.41) (7.80)  (6.76) (6.21)  (7.87) (7.31)  (5.05) (4.90) 
Special Education Students (%) -56.46 -0.60  -8.84 -8.53  -25.45 -1.28  -29.00 -17.98 
 (33.36) (30.19)  (21.81) (14.77)  (22.79) (20.21)  (16.92) (14.81) 
Math Proficiency (%) -2403.92 -1598.96  474.70 2175.41  1941.29 3302.31*  543.56 544.57 
 (1711.83) (1364.62)  (1548.92) (1940.41)  (1499.44) (1536.39)  (980.73) (789.24) 
Reading Proficiency (%) 2138.88 2777.77  -713.92 -1129.14  -680.67 -2551.21  -1055.75 -1199.62 
 (2274.26) (1998.57)  (1604.72) (1829.15)  (1692.63) (1548.08)  (1358.20) (1060.68) 
Teacher Factors            
Experience (years) -57.16*** -9.18  -63.88*** -9.92  -55.06*** -7.18  -82.98*** -40.73*** 
 (15.41) (12.42)  (14.12) (11.00)  (12.60) (12.01)  (7.95) (7.29) 
Master’s Degree or Better -296.78 -121.52  -249.33 -302.53  -464.89* -405.82  -34.36 -48.60 
 (263.27) (235.64)  (256.17) (238.94)  (230.58) (228.55)  (138.47) (135.80) 
Female -1111.57*** -371.60  -1114.93*** -514.05*  -368.24 -363.11  269.20 265.90* 
 (271.36) (284.94)  (275.52) (257.98)  (264.71) (213.66)  (146.18) (119.53) 
Black -1208.01 -587.83  1430.13 2415.32  1009.78 1627.23  -255.86 449.56 
 (1243.20) (867.06)  (1663.04) (1871.32)  (1639.43) (1395.62)  (843.80) (500.06) 
Hispanic 154.29 233.88  1699.85** 577.37  -0.44 297.36  -568.62 -515.14 
 (649.30) (588.41)  (619.83) (478.32)  (671.56) (549.91)  (440.08) (339.55) 
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Table 6 (cont’d). Placing a Monetary Value as Opposed to Subjective Attitude 
 
a Referent group is urban community ; b Referent group is elementary school;  c Referent group is less competitive 
* p <.05, ** p <.01, ***p <.001 
 Merit Pay  Subject-area Pay  Combat Pay  NBPTS Incentive 
Variable Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS  Tobit OLS 
College Selectivity c            
     Selective -630.81 235.37  71.89 -22.51  341.51 486.81  53.02 -22.54 
 (448.08) (358.55)  (383.79) (397.37)  (409.27) (390.66)  (263.96) (258.55) 
     Competitive 0.70 320.58  -181.25 -243.44  -196.50 174.42  -283.31 -262.77 
 (401.10) (326.89)  (341.97) (317.99)  (266.90) (266.06)  (243.96) (213.38) 
Bachelor’s in Math or Science 46.98 290.36  407.76 523.68  -121.43 -62.68  116.60 212.50 
 (557.36) (592.61)  (446.46) (394.47)  (423.11) (347.50)  (352.04) (352.67) 
Teaching Assignment in Math or Science -1255.57 -1472.38***  1194.46 663.56  91.00 -419.96  -125.88 -537.58 
 (1635.05) (318.66)  (1334.71) (1138.55)  (1092.61) (880.18)  (702.04) (722.04) 
Assignment x School Type Interaction            
     High School—Math Science Assign. 3238.10 2008.29**  3053.41* 994.44  1180.98 609.97  757.37 381.00 
 (1752.49) (613.88)  (1425.90) (1211.87)  (1216.89) (1028.62)  (772.78) (767.43) 
     Middle School—Math Science Assign. 2196.67 2633.93***  2266.37 663.23  1383.62 1148.50  359.37 643.97 
 (1733.57) (727.42)  (1388.38) (1167.98)  (1268.27) (1070.26)  (800.50) (808.50) 
Receives Pay Incentive -1010.23 -999.98  2876.87 1593.36*  1206.55* -41.91  4785.95*** 3433.46*** 
 (3701.14) (580.82)  (1655.40) (720.32)  (501.59) (384.79)  (499.89) (592.29) 
Household Income (per $1,000) 11.56 11.00  5.43 7.28  1.81 2.36  -2.29 -0.80 
 (6.12) (6.56)  (4.47) (4.17)  (3.90) (3.11)  (2.76) (2.28) 
Married -329.48 -228.57  -271.32 -65.43  -145.41 -88.02  -126.56 -8.28 
 (364.27) (278.40)  (275.71) (223.25)  (265.24) (233.74)  (169.82) (157.28) 
Member of Teachers Union -1322.12* -1156.58*  -277.48 -1118.55**  -456.22 -563.14  178.33 -80.45 
 (637.97) (556.75)  (572.44) (412.88)  (646.47) (530.21)  (445.97) (349.65) 
Teacher Trust Index -903.44** -487.57**  -42.84 19.93  -271.42 -77.81  -157.69 37.47 
 (297.71) (175.27)  (189.36) (165.75)  (180.97) (170.08)  (122.26) (100.96) 
Principal Trust Index 375.70* -89.05  -100.61 -275.31  -94.21 -209.05  203.52* -71.30 
 (174.76) (201.97)  (166.75) (187.93)  (142.94) (148.60)  (81.51) (90.53) 
Constant 1388.70 5220.10  3283.38 5483.77  5174.51 6531.05  3774.43 5617.73 
 (2090.74) (1942.13)  (1660.66) (1357.71)  (1802.91) (1487.18)  (1296.36) (1240.73) 
- Log-likelihood 12,198.1   18,564.2   24,213.8   19,545.7  
Sample Size 2,831 1,116  2,849 1,780  2,858 2,379  2,838 1,966 
Left-Censored 1,715   1,069   479   872  
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Salary Versus Working Conditions 
As noted previously, whether or not teacher attitudes about compensation reform matter rests 
on the assumption that teachers will respond to financial incentives. Others would argue that if 
policymakers want to affect teacher behavior they should focus on improving working 
conditions, not finances. Money may matter, the argument goes, but teachers are really more 
concerned about improved working conditions. We estimate parameters for teacher preferences 
regarding the trade-off between increases in pay and roughly cost-equivalent improvements in 
working conditions (we explain how the working condition improvements were calculated in 
footnote 11). We use an admittedly restricted set of alternatives—reduced class size, a teacher’s 
aide, and more preparation time—which ignores other important working conditions that 
teachers may care about, such as the amount of support they get from their principal. 
Nevertheless, we think these alternatives provide useful comparisons because they are working 
conditions that are amenable to policy change. All things considered, it is more straightforward 
to imagine using policy to reduce class size or increase preparation time than to improve a 
principal’s leadership ability. 
Although teachers in general appear to prefer money instead of the changes in working 
conditions presented in the survey (see table 3), the logit results suggest that high school and 
middle school teachers are more likely than elementary school teachers to prefer money instead 
of smaller classes or a teacher’s aide.19 By contrast, women appear more likely to prefer 
improvements in working conditions to increases in salary. On balance, however, the results on 
teacher preferences for salary increases versus working conditions shown in table 3 do not 
appear to be systematically related to individual or school characteristics.  
Conclusion 
In the spring of 2007, The Future of Children (FOC) devoted an entire issue to teacher 
quality. Among its key recommendations is a clear call to reform pay structures in education— 
indeed, the FOC authors mention many of the reforms covered in the WSTCS: working 
condition and skill differentials, pay for performance, and so on (The Future of Children 2007). 
Importantly, the authors frame their argument by recommending the pursuit of “carefully 
designed and implemented pilot programs,” to help policymakers better understand the likely 
impact of these reforms.  Our findings suggest that policy makers who want to take this advice 
and move forward with compensation reform pilots should think carefully about where (and 
how) they place their bets.   
For example, our results suggest unsurprisingly that veteran teachers are less supportive of 
compensation reforms than novice teachers.  This may be because after a career in teaching, 
experienced teachers’ beliefs preclude the differentiation at the heart of all forms of incentive 
pay. Or it may be that non-random attrition from the teacher workforce results in veterans who 
are more risk averse or more egalitarian in their outlook. In addition, our results suggest that 
secondary school teachers may be more supportive of various pay reforms, especially merit pay 
and subject-area pay.  
                                                
19 Although not shown, the logit results are available from the authors upon request.  
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When it comes to types of reform, teachers are most supportive of combat pay and least 
supportive of merit pay.  As a 36-year veteran wrote (unsolicited) on her returned survey:  
$5,000 more a year [in merit pay] would allow me to pay off my mortgage by 
retirement, to clean up my home improvement loan, maybe do some repairs that 
are needed, maybe take a vacation, buy some classroom materials, take a class. 
But I will not do it at the expense of my friends.  
Such sentiments may partly explain the political difficulties that statewide merit pay reforms, 
such as Florida and Texas’ merit pay plans, have recently faced.  When everyone is required to 
participate in a merit pay plan, a large portion of teachers is likely to have misgivings.  Instead, 
policymakers would do well to follow the lead of Denver Public Schools, where compensation 
reform packages are optional for veteran teachers but mandatory for younger teachers, and where 
the package includes a range of reforms, not just pay-for-performance.  Likewise, Minnesota’s 
optional statewide incentive plan - districts choose to join or not - suggests how an opt-in policy 
at the state-level might minimize political resistance.  
We conclude with a reminder that our analysis says nothing of the politics of adoption. 
Whether a district is able to successfully adopt compensation reform clearly depends on its 
relationship with its teachers union, not just the attitudes of individual teachers. And while the 
WSTCS presents these various incentive plans as if they are separate from each other, if 
compensation reform is to have the types of effects that advocates and reformers hope for, 
various combinations of incentives may need to be considered: not just merit pay alone but 
merit-pay combined with subject-area pay and/or combat pay and/or NBPTS incentives. Teacher 
opinions about such combinations are an important topic for future research. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
School Factors (N =1,316)   
Community Type:   
   Urban  .27 
   Suburban  .52 
   Rural  .20 
School Type:   
   High School  .23 
   Middle School  .22 
   Elementary School  .55 
School Enrollment 582 .97 
Ratio of Students to Teachers 16 .73 
Eligible for Free/Reduced-Price Lunch (%) 41 .82 
Special Education Students (%) 12 .54 
Math Proficiency (%) 53 .36 
Reading Proficiency (%) 73 .32 
Teacher Factors (N= 3,120) a  
Experience (years) 13 .72 
Household Income (per $1,000) 88 .46 
Master’s Degree or Better (=1)  .62 
Bachelor’s in Math or Science (=1)  .08 
Teaching Assignment in Math or Science (=1)  .15 
College Selectivity a  
   Selective  .23 
   Competitive  .66 
   Less Competitive  .09 
International/Unknown  .03 
Teacher Trust Index (1=low, 4=high) 3 .30 
Principal Trust Index (1=low, 4=high) 2 .96 
Female (=1)  .67 
Black (=1)  .01 
Hispanic (=1)  .02 
Married (=1)  .74 
Member of Teachers Union (=1)  .96 
a Calculated using sampling weights. 
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Appendix B. Administrative Data, Survey Design, and Response Rates 
The education landscape in Washington State provides a useful case for exploring teacher 
attitudes in context. As in most states, Washington’s teacher shortages are more acute in specific 
subject areas, such as mathematics, science, and special education (Lashway and Maloney 2004), 
and turnover rates are higher in schools with higher concentrations of poverty (Plecki et al. 
2005). Furthermore, teachers in Washington work under a standards system that includes 
alignment between standards in core subjects, grade-level expectations, and a criterion-
referenced test to measure student achievement known as the Washington Assessment of Student 
Learning, or WASL. Although Washington’s accountability system does not include sanctions or 
rewards for performance, school, district, and state performance on the WASL is widely 
publicized in local newspapers and the state’s on-line School Report Card system. Teachers and 
schools in Washington also face performance pressure under the federal No Child Left Behind 
Act. Finally, the state’s districts and schools represent a wide range of size, student populations, 
and performance, in a range of settings (urban, suburban, and rural). To date, teachers in 
Washington State arguably have little first-hand exposure to compensation reform, but, as we 
noted earlier, this may change in the near future (Washington Learns 2006). 
Administrative Data  
Secondary data gathered on Washington State schools and teachers are from three sources: 
the Washington State S-275 personnel report; the Washington State Report Card, prepared by the 
Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI); and the Common Core of Data (CCD) 
produced by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The S-275 is an annual 
personnel-reporting process, which provides a record of certificated and classified employees of 
the school districts and educational service districts (ESD) of the state of Washington. The 
Washington State Report Card offers school-level achievement data, largely assessed by the 
Washington State Assessment of Student Learning (WASL), and student and teacher 
demographics. The CCD provides school- and district-level information for all public elementary 
and secondary schools in the United States. This database reports general building information as 
well as student and staff counts. 
The data items in the S-275 report fall into four categories: demographic information, state 
Legislative Evaluation and Accountability Program (LEAP) placement information, contract 
information, and assignment information. Demographics collected on each employee include the 
individual’s name, certification number, age, gender, and ethnicity. LEAP placement information 
is collected for individuals with at least one duty assignment as a certificated employee. The data 
reported include highest degree type (bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate, vocational, etc.), year 
highest degree was awarded, academic and eligible in-service credits, and certificated years of 
experience. The contract information provides data on the certificated-based contract hours per 
full-time equivalent (FTE) day and the contracted number of days, final salary, and annual 
insurance and mandatory benefits. Assignments are distinguished by five variables: building, 
program, activity, duty, and grade group (PK, K, elementary, middle, and secondary). 
Data contained in the Washington State Report Card include student performance 
information on the WASL, a summary of each school’s adequate yearly progress, and student 
and staff demographics. The WASL scores are reported as the percent of students meeting state 
Working Paper 20  Goldhaber, DeArmond, and DeBurgomaster 
 
29 
standards on subjects of mathematics, reading, writing, and science respectively.20 Adequate 
yearly progress, as required by No Child Left Behind (NCLB), reflects a school’s performance on 
the WASL in mathematics and reading according to a state-set level of proficiency. Generally 
demographics are also provided and include student group counts and staff experience and 
education data. 
The CCD database on public schools reports general building information and student and 
staff information. General building data encompass names, addresses, and telephone numbers; 
types of schools (regular, special education, vocational, and alternative); operational status; 
school flags (charter, magnets, Title I, and Title I School-wide); and level of school. Student 
demographic data include items such as membership counts by Pre-K–12 and ungraded, counts 
of FRL-eligible and migrant students, and counts by race/ethnicity. The staffing information 
includes FTE classroom teacher counts and pupil-to-teacher ratio. 
Sampling Procedures 
The sampling frame of Washington State teachers was generated from the S-275 report for 
the 2003-04 school year. From the database, we identified 48,136 full-time public school 
classroom teachers based on school building codes, contracted hours per day and number of 
days, percentage of contract actually worked, and assignment duty codes for teaching staff (31, 
32, or 33) out of 56,412 personnel.21 In order to identify “current” teachers, the sampling frame 
was restricted to only school facilities listed as operational or “open” for the 2003-04 school 
year, according to the Washington State OSPI and the U.S. Department of Education. The 
resulting sampling frame was comprised of 47,229 classroom teachers and 1,903 school 
buildings. 
To arrive at our sample of classroom teachers, we generated a stratified sample based on 
district, school, and teacher characteristics reported in the secondary data sources. Specifically, 
teacher selection was based on the metropolitan status of the district, poverty level of the school, 
and experience level of the teacher. Our district metropolitan-status measure classified a district 
as serving either an urban, suburban, or rural locale. Following a similar variable construction 
scheme as the Schools and Staffing Survey, district urbanicity is a 3-level collapse of the CCD’s 
2003-04 categorization of district locale with districts serving a large or mid-size central city 
classified as urban, urban fringe or large town designated as suburban, and small town or rural 
locales defined as rural districts.22 Using the measure of the percentage of students receiving 
free/reduced-price lunch (FRL) from the 2004-05 Washington State Report Card, we defined 
three levels of school poverty by dividing the FRL distribution into thirds.23 This procedure 
produced three categories: low poverty (0 to 27 percent receiving FRL), moderate poverty (28 to 
                                                
20 Reading and mathematics performance is assessed for grades 3-8 and 10, while writing and science 
performance is assessed intermittently during these grades. 
21 Full-time status was defined as personnel contracted to work at least six hours a day and 180 days during the 
school year and actually worked within one week of their assignment contract. 
22 The CCD categorizes districts’ metropolitan status according to the location of school buildings and uses 
eight designations: large city [1], mid-sized city [2], urban fringe of a large city [3], urban fringe of a mid-sized city 
[4], large town [5] and small town [6], rural outside Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) [7], and rural inside CBSA 
[8]. CBSA refers to a geographic area with a population of between 10,000 and 50,000. 
23 The 2004-05 wave of the Washington State Report Card was used instead of the 2003-04 reporting due to a 
high proportion of missing values in the proceeding year (roughly 20 percent missing compared to 8 percent). Given 
the high correlation between the two measures (0.89), we were confident in substituting the later year.  
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46 percent), or high poverty (47 to 100 percent). Finally, teachers taken from the S-275 
personnel file are grouped according to three experience levels: 0 to 5 years of experience, 5 to10 
years of experience, and 10 or more years of experience. These stratification variables generated 
a sampling grid containing 27 cells (total possible combination of teachers in each of these 
categories). 
Using SAS PROC SURVEYSELECT procedures, teachers who fit the appropriate criteria 
were randomly selected to fill each cell in the sampling grid. Our project budget allowed us to 
sample 185 teachers per cell, generating a stratified random sample of 4,995 teachers. Prior to 
mailing the surveys, 25 teachers were pulled from the original sample due to teaching 
assignments in non-traditional schools (e.g., juvenile detention center). An additional 268 
teachers were later sampled to replace teachers working “ineligible” assignments (see section on 
Survey Administration below for details). The total sample included 5,238 Washington State 
teachers. 
Survey Administration 
The WSTCS was conducted in March 2006 based on a stratified random sample of all 
teachers in Washington State. Teachers were sent pre-notice letters (as were their principals) 
informing them of the study’s purpose and that a survey would arrive within the week.24 Surveys 
were then mailed, each of which included a $10 incentive. Two weeks later, respondents were 
sent a postcard thanking them for their participation if they had already completed and returned 
the survey and if not, reminding them to return the survey. Four weeks after the initial survey 
mailing date, replacement paper surveys were sent to teachers who had not returned the survey.  
At the time of the second mailing of the paper surveys, a second wave of teachers was 
randomly selected from our sampling pool to replace “ineligible” respondents from the first 
sample. A teacher was classified as ineligible if the response to the survey question, Are you a 
classroom teacher? was “No”.25 In order to determine the eligibility of non-respondents, we 
consulted current (2005-06 academic year) district and school websites for teacher rosters from 
which participants were identified by first and last name. Identified participants were deemed 
ineligible for the survey if they were listed as working in a non-classroom teacher assignment 
(e.g., Learning Center, Resource Room, Special Services, Reading Specialist, and so on). 
In total, 268 teachers were sampled as part of the second wave of teachers (219 ineligible 
respondents and 49 identified via on-line rosters). Following the procedures of the first wave, 
teachers were mailed pre-notice letters, followed by a survey with a $10 incentive a week later. 
Unlike the first wave of teachers, participants selected for the second wave were not sent a 
reminder postcard or a second paper survey. 
Response Rates 
Survey designers have increasingly called for great transparency in reporting response rates, 
noting that few researchers explain how rates are calculated or estimate inflated rates by simply 
                                                
24 All survey-related materials were mailed to the teacher’s school.  
25 A classroom teacher was defined for participants as “teachers who have responsibility for instructing a full 
class of students on a daily basis. Other teachers, who instruct small groups of exceptional or remedial students in 
pull-out programs or specialist teachers, such as art, science, or computer science teachers who move from 
classroom to classroom to teach a particular subject, need not complete the survey”. 
Working Paper 20  Goldhaber, DeArmond, and DeBurgomaster 
 
31 
eliminating units from the denominator (Lohr 1999). Following this advice, we report several 
different response rates for the WSTCS. Generally, survey research standards purport a 60 
percent response rate as a standard for “acceptability,” although higher rates are clearly better 
(Dillman 2000). 
For this study, the most conservative estimate—dividing the number of “complete-eligible” 
surveys by the total number of teachers sampled—places our response rate at 59.56 percent 
(3,120/ 5,238). A complete-eligible survey refers to a returned survey from a sampled participant 
who identified herself or himself as a classroom teacher and responded to the remaining survey 
questions. A total of 256 surveys were classified as “complete-ineligible”, whereby a sampled 
participant identified herself (himself) as a non-classroom teacher. In addition to these complete-
ineligible respondents, 55 of the sampled teachers were identified by the school’s staff as no 
longer working at their 2003-04 school. When removing these known ineligible surveys from the 
total number of teachers sampled, our response rate increases to 63.32 percent (3,120/4,927). 
While this readjusted rate is above the acceptable threshold, we suspect our response rate 
may be better given that our sampling frame of Washington State teachers represents a difficult-
to-reach population. First, despite using the most-recent S-275 Personnel Report available for the 
WSTCS, the list of teachers was two years removed from the onset of the project. This lag 
between teachers’ location in the teaching profession and start of the survey project is 
noteworthy when considering the rate at which teachers switch schools or exit the teaching 
profession entirely. Drawing on data from the 1999-2000 School and Staffing Survey and the 
related 2000-2001 Teacher Follow-up Survey, the National Center for Education Statistics 
reports that 15 percent of public school teachers did not teach in the same school from one 
school year to the next, with 8 percent transferring to a new school, 3 percent taking a job outside 
of teaching, and almost 2 percent retiring.26 Applying this mobility rate to our sample of 
teachers, taking into account a two-year lag, we can conservatively anticipate 2.25 percent of our 
sample or nearly 120 teachers experiencing some movement in the teaching profession. 
Second, there is reason to believe a portion of non-respondents worked assignments 
considered ineligible for the study (i.e., non-classroom teacher) and thus chose not to return their 
survey. A number of returned surveys from ineligible teachers were accompanied with a written 
note expressing displeasure with being excluded from the study. For instance, one respondent 
wrote, “It has taken me some time to return this survey to you because I have really struggled 
with what to do. I am a special education teacher and, therefore, I am not supposed to answer the 
survey. I was tempted to do so anyway, however, in the end my personal ethics would not allow 
me to do so.” Another teacher commented, “I still am assigned classrooms. I am required to 
submit grades for them—why isn’t my workload being considered in this study?” Other teachers, 
who worked eligible assignments in previous school years, expressed similar dissatisfaction. 
Overall, these comments were typical of ineligible respondents and suggest some propensity 
toward not responding. 
In order to gain some purchase on teachers’ mobility in and out of the profession and 
eligibility for the study among the 1,770 non-respondents, we consulted current (2005-06 
academic year) staff/teacher rosters on school and district websites. Identifying teachers by first 
                                                
26 Research suggests that teachers in low-paying, poor-performing schools serving large numbers of racial and 
ethnic minorities are more likely to switch schools or leave the profession altogether, particularly teachers early in 
their careers (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004). 
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and last name, a participant was classified as ineligible if he or she was listed as working a non-
classroom assignment (e.g., Learning Center, Resource Room, Special Services, or Reading 
Specialist). A total of 41 teachers were identified as working an ineligible assignment. 
Determining if a teacher no longer worked at a school posed a greater challenge, whereby 
identification was made if a participant’s name was not found on the current school or district 
roster. While taking great pains to classify a sampled teacher as no-longer-working-in-the-same-
school only if rosters were up-to-date (e.g., specifically identify the staff as 2005-06, 
staff/teacher websites and profiles, teacher email addresses), the likelihood of misidentifying a 
teacher is high. Thus, our count of 760 teachers as no longer working in the same school should 
be interpreted cautiously.27 
Taking into consideration teachers’ mobility and assignment eligibility among non-
respondents along with the known-respondents places our response rate at an upper limit of 
75.62 percent. Again, given the high degree of uncertainty regarding our estimate of teachers no-
longer-working-in-the-same-school, our response rate likely falls closer to 65 percent. 
                                                
27 A total of 969 non-respondents could not be identified as either ineligible or no longer working at their same 
school. Only 37 of the surveyed teachers directly refused to participate. 
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Appendix C. Variable Coding  
Coding of Dependent Variables 
Support for incentive pay: We used a four-category variable—strongly oppose, somewhat 
oppose, somewhat favor, strongly favor—to measure teachers’ support for providing extra pay to 
four types of teachers: (1) teachers who specialize in hard-to-fill subjects such as science or 
mathematics, (2) teachers who work in tough neighborhoods with low-performing schools, (3) 
teaches whose students make greater gains on standardized tests than similar students taught by 
other teachers, and (4) teachers who receive certification from the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). Source: WSTCS 
 
Ranking of incentive pay: For teachers’ rankings of the different incentive pay plans we used a 
four-category variable that forced respondents to rank the four types of teachers relative to one 
another. Respondents were asked to give a rank of 1 to the teacher they would most support 
giving extra pay to, a 2 to the one they would support the next most, and so on until they ranked 
all four teachers. Source: WSTCS 
 
Fair incentive amount: We used a continuous variable to measure the amount of extra pay 
teachers think is fair to give each of the four types of teachers, compared to otherwise similar 
teachers (e.g., same experience and degrees). If respondents thought that no amount of extra pay 
was fair, they were instructed to record their answer as “0.” Source: WSTCS 
 
Coding of Independent Variables 
Community type: We used three dummy variables measuring school-level location: (1) urban; (2) 
suburban; and (3) rural. Using the CCD’s 2003-04 categorization of school locale, urban is 
defined as schools serving a large or mid-size central city classified as urban; suburban is defined 
as schools in an urban fringe or large town; and rural is defined as schools in a small town or 
rural locale. Source: CCD 2003-04 
 
High school: Dummy variable indicating respondent’s school is a high school (grade levels 
between PK-12 and must include grade 11). Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
Middle school: Dummy variable indicating respondent’s school is a middle school (grade levels 
between PK-10 and must include at least grade 7). Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
Elementary school: Dummy variable indicating respondent’s school is an elementary school 
(grade levels between, but not exceeding, PK-6). Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
School Enrollment: Total number of student enrollments at respondent’s school. Source: OSPI 
Report Card 2005-06 
 
Ratio of students to teachers: Continuous variable of the total number of students divided by the 
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total teacher FTE (full-time equivalent) count in a respondent’s school. Source: OSPI Report Card 
2005-06 
 
Eligible for free/reduced-price lunch: Percentage of students at respondent’s school eligible for 
free/reduced-price lunch program. Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
Special education: Percentage of students at respondent’s schools served by programs for 
students with disabilities. Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
School performance: Continuous measure using two variables: the percentage of students in 
grades 3-8 and 10 passing the Washington Assessment of Student Learning for mathematics and 
reading. A dummy variable was included for schools missing performance scores due to grade 
spans outside the assessed range (e.g., PK-2) Source: OSPI Report Card 2005-06 
 
Years of teaching experience: Continuous variable indicating the number of certificated years the 
teacher has taught in Washington State. Source: 2003-04 S-275 Personnel Report 
 
Household Income: Continuous measure of respondent’s total household income, including all 
earners in their household. We collapsed the response options, presented to respondents in ranges 
from $20,000–$29,999 to $90,000–$99,999, $100,000–$149,999, and more than $150,000, to the 
midpoint of each range with the exception of the “more than $150,000” option, which was 
capped at $180,000. Source: WSTCS 
 
Master’s degree or higher: Dummy variable indicating whether respondent has a master’s 
degree or higher. Source: 2003-04 S-275 Personnel Report 
 
Technical degree: Dummy variable indicating whether respondent has a bachelor’s degree in 
mathematics (mathematics or statistics) or the natural sciences (biology/life sciences, chemistry, 
geology/earth science, or physics). Source: WSTCS 
 
Technical assignment: Dummy variable indicating whether respondent’s main teaching 
assignment is in either mathematics (algebra, basic and general mathematics, business and 
applied math, calculus and pre-calculus, computer science, geometry, pre-algebra, statistics and 
probability, trigonometry) or natural sciences (general science, biology/life science, chemistry, 
earth sciences, integrated science, physical science, physics). Source: WSTCS 
 
College selectivity: A series of dummy variables indicating whether the respondent attended a 
Selective or a Competitive college (Less Competitive is the omitted group). Our college 
selectivity measures come from Barron’s Profiles of American College’s rankings for the year 
1986, when the mean teacher surveyed would have graduated college. We collapse Barron’s six 
rankings—most competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, competitive, less 
competitive, and non-competitive—into three categories: selective, competitive, and less 
competitive. Our “selective” category collapses Barron’s top three rankings because of the small 
number of teachers graduating from these schools. Barron’s rankings also list some schools as 
highly competitive (+) and very competitive (+) if they are on the border of the next category. 
Working Paper 20  Goldhaber, DeArmond, and DeBurgomaster 
 
35 
We included them in the listed category, not the next highest category. Source: Created from 
WSTCS 
 
Teacher trust: Constructed from responses to questions about how strongly the respondent 
agrees or disagrees (coded on four point scale: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly 
Agree) with the following two statements: “Teachers at my school think of each other as partners 
in educating children,” and “Teachers in my school respect those colleagues who are expert at 
their craft.” Given the high correlation between the two questions (r = .64), responses were 
averaged to produce an index measure with a minimum value of 1 (= low trust) and maximum 
value of 4 (= high trust). Source: WSTCS 
 
Principal trust: Constructed from responses to questions about how strong the respondent agrees 
or disagrees (coded on four point scale: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree) 
with the following two statements: “The principal at my school is an effective manager who 
makes the school run smoothly,” and “The principal looks out for the personal welfare of the 
faculty members.” Given the high correlation between the two questions (r = .76), responses 
were averaged to produce an index measure with a minimum value of 1= low trust and maximum 
value of 4 = high trust. Source: WSTCS 
 
Receiving Pay Incentive: Dummy variable indicating whether a respondent receives the pay 
incentive in question. Source: WSTCS 
 
Gender: Dummy variable indicating the respondent is female. Source: WSTCS 
 
Race/Ethnicity: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is black and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent is Hispanic. Source: 2003-04 S-275 Personnel Report 
 
Marriage Status: Dummy variable indicating whether respondent is currently married. Source: 
WSTCS 
 
Teacher Union: Dummy variable indicating whether respondent is a member of a teachers’ 
union. Source: WSTCS 
